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Over the past two decades, Croatian social health insur-
ance  system  has  undergone  a  number  of  reforms  that 
were aimed at addressing the rising financial gap between 
the demand for health care and available public resources. 
The single most important observation regarding its de-
velopment until 2008 is that, while attempting to provide 
quick fix solutions to worrying financial performance, the 
implemented  reforms  did  not  adequately  take  into  ac-
count some of the root causes of the system’s sustainabil-
ity issues, such as high public spending, a narrow base of 
financial contributors, generous benefits, and system inef-
ficiencies that resulted in unnecessary expenditures and in 
low financial discipline. This text provides an overview of 
the segments of the reform of the Croatian social health in-
surance system that was implemented from 2008 to 2010 
with two primary goals: financial stabilization and increas-
ing system efficiency. These include changes introduced 
to the revenue collection mechanism, copayment levels, 
hospital and primary care payment models, introduction 
of a comprehensive primary health care information tech-
nology (IT) system, improved control of sick leave com-
pensations, and advanced regulation of the pharmaceuti-
cal market. In order to properly review these measures, it 
is necessary to understand the context in which the social 
health insurance system existed until 2008.
The CrOaTiaN heaLTh Care SySTeM uNTiL 2008
In the period from 2000 to 2008, as other Central Euro-
pean  countries  of  comparable  development  and  gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, Croatia spent a sub-
stantial  proportion  of  its  GDP  on  health  care.  Howev-
er, in absolute terms, Croatia did not spend an excessive 
amount on health care per capita (1), with lower spend-
ing reported only in Hungary (2,3; Table 1). While avail-
able World Health Organization data show a decreasing 
share of public expenditure in the total expenditure 67 Vončina et al: Croatian 2008-2010 health insurance reform
www.cmj.hr
on health between 2000 and 2008 in all selected countries, 
the share of public expenditure in Croatia has nevertheless 
been larger than in other countries, and comparable only 
to that of the Czech Republic (Supplementary Table 1). The 
level of public spending on health relative to other coun-
tries is even better visible from public sector expenditure 
on health as percentage of total government expenditure 
(Supplementary Table 2). It may be argued that both indi-
cators show the continued importance of health care on 
the Croatian policy-making agenda resulting in high pub-
lic expenditure. Before Croatia declared independence in 
1990, the former Yugoslav system had been organized at 
the regional level under the guiding principle of “self-man-
aging socialism” that (albeit only nominally) provided uni-
versal and comprehensive coverage of all health services 
free at the point of use. Consequently, access to health care 
came to be viewed as a universal right of citizenship (1).
The Croatian health care system is financially dominated 
by the national social health insurance fund – the Croatian 
Institute for Health Insurance (Croatian: Hrvatski zavod za 
zdravstveno osiguranje, HZZO). The HZZO offers two sepa-
rate health insurance packages. Mandatory health insur-
ance (MHI) provides a basic generous package of services 
and products. Contributions are mandatory and are levied 
at 15% of gross salary (5). Access to services for the ma-
jority of the population is not entirely free at the point of 
use, but is subject to co-payments that prior to 2008 were 
modest, although enlarged on several occasions affecting 
the accessibility of the system, and a substantial part of 
the population was exempted. In addition, the HZZO of-
fers its voluntary complementary health insurance (CHI) 
package with community-rated premiums that cover the 
expense of all co-payments. Private health insurance com-
panies offer insurance packages that can cover co-pay-
ments and a higher standard of accommodation (hotel 
amenities in hospitals) in HZZO-contracted providers and 
products and services provided by private insurers (Sup-
plementary Figure 1).
The  bulk  of  public  funds  for  MHI  originate  from  one 
source: payroll contributions. In addition, a minor part of 
funds is collected by general taxation. Thus, as elsewhere 
in social health insurance countries, the funding of Croa-
tia’s MHI system does not depend solely on salary contri-
butions and it displays characteristics of both Bismarck 
and Beveridge systems (6). In effect, HZZO expenditure 
on health is prospectively determined for every subse-
quent year by forecasting the amount that will be collect-
ed from salary contributions, determining the amount of 
funds to be hypothecated for health from general taxa-
tion, and negotiations on expenditure between the Min-
istry of Health and Social Welfare, the HZZO, and the Min-
istry of Finance.
Contributions for MHI (at a uniform rate of 15% of gross 
income) have since 2002 been levied on both salaries and 
honoraria. Subsidization of the non-contributing insured 
through funds from general taxation was until 2008 loosely 
regulated by the Health Insurance Act, which determined 
that it was an obligation of the state to ensure funds for 
medical  treatment  and  cash  compensations  for  certain 
categories of the population that do not financially con-
tribute to MHI (such as the unemployed registered with 
the state Employment Office, students and high-school 
pupils, drafted soldiers, uninsured Croatian war veterans 
and their caregivers, farmers over the age of 65, disabled, 
etc.), but did not specify it in more detail (7).
TaBLe 1. Total health expenditure, expressed in uS dollars per capita and the percentages of the gross domestic product (in the 
parentheses) (2,3)
year
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Croatia   842 (7.8)   844 (7.3) 790 (6.3) 869 (6.5) 968 (6.7) 1071 (7.0) 1184 (7.1) 1398 (7.6) 1496 (7.8)
Czech Republic   980 (6.5) 1082 (6.7) 1195 (7.1) 1339 (7.4) 1422 (7.4) 1477 (7.2) 1535 (7.0) 1626 (6.8) 1684 (6.8)
Hungary   852 (7.0)   970 (7.2) 1114 (7.5) 1284 (8.3) 1305 (8.0) 1411 (8.3) 1452 (8.1) 1388 (7.4) 1419 (7.4)
Slovakia   720 (6.6)   837 (6.9)   922 (7.1) 1024 (7.5) 1057 (7.2) 1139 (7.0) 1322 (7.3) 1555 (7.7) 1717 (7.8)
Slovenia 1447 (8.3) 1581 (8.6) 1693 (8.6) 1772 (8.7) 1869 (8.4) 1986 (8.5) 2056 (8.3) 2099 (7.8) 2183 (7.8)
TaBLe 2. Provider arrears in millions of hrK, 2000 to 2005 (4)
hospitals all health care providers
end of: total debts due arrears total debts due arrears
2000 1682   686 2142   758
2001 1893   877 2296   947
2002 1826   777 2307   865
2003 2269 1095 2778 1178
2004 2569 1108 3235 1406
2005 3213 1508 3887 1797health Care essay 68 Croat Med J. 2012;53:66-76
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Croatian social health insurance system faces several long 
term trends that threaten the economic sustainability of 
revenue collection: a low percentage of those who active-
ly financially contribute to the MHI fund (the employed) 
compared to the total number of beneficiaries, the aging 
of the Croatian population caused by long standing de-
creases in natality, fertility, and natural increment, with al-
most 15.7% of the population aged 65 and over in 2001 
(8); and in the last five decades the consequent increase in 
the percentage of persons aged 65+ who do not financial-
ly contribute to the system, and are its heaviest spenders. 
Furthermore, the proportion of the total population that 
actively contributes to the MHI is around 36% (9,10; Sup-
plementary Table 3).
Historically, until 2008 the government made little effort 
to diversify the revenue base for the health sector. Reve-
nue generation of the MHI was generally limited by payroll 
tax as its dominant collection mechanism by which only 
one third of members made contributions. Government 
budget transfers from general revenues to the MHI fund 
have been variable until 2008 and heavily dependent on 
the economic situation. Thus, the fund-raising system for 
HZZO’s MHI was made increasingly dependent on salary 
contributions, and consequently on the employment ra-
tio and wage level – which until the recession enjoyed fa-
vorable trends. Contributions for MHI accounted for more 
than 95% of mandatory health insurance expenditure in 
2007, compared with 84% in 2002 (11-15; Supplementary 
Table 4).
Fundamental challenges for the Croatian government dur-
ing times of economic crisis have been similar to those 
of other European countries: how to expand the health 
care system’s funding base and prevent health care costs 
from outgrowing the funding base. In the last couple of 
decades, overall health care expenditures of the leading 
European  countries  (Switzerland,  France,  Italy,  Germany, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom) have grown on average 
by about 80%, while the GDP of the group has grown only 
by 25%. Since the beginning of the global crisis, health care 
expenditures in the above mentioned countries continued 
to outpace GDP and wages. This problem was surely ag-
gravated by unemployment generated during the recent 
economic recession, which adversely affected the depen-
dency ratio – that is, the ratio between the number of 
people who contribute economically to the social welfare 
system and the number who receive benefits. And the de-
pendency ratio is expected to deteriorate further in most 
European countries over the next decade (16).
In order to receive public funds for providing health ser-
vices in Croatia, all providers regardless of ownership are 
required to enter into annual contracts with the HZZO that 
set prices for services and mechanisms of payment. In the 
past, the HZZO tried to limit its expenditure on hospital-
provided  care  through  hard  budgets,  gatekeeping,  and 
limitations on the number of allowed referrals for general 
practitioners (GP) and other doctors employed in primary 
health care; and its expenditure for primary care through 
the capitation payment system. Regardless, due to the so-
cial sensitivity of hospital health care, annual hospital hard 
budgets have in the past often been enlarged during on-
going years, ie, on four occasions in 2003 (11). Besides hav-
ing a direct influence on HZZO’s expenditure, these cre-
ated detrimental incentives toward HZZO and, particularly, 
hospital efficiency as they created a widespread impres-
sion that the government would cover all deficits, with-
out considering how these were created. For illustration, 
from 2000 to 2005, despite several state interventions that 
poured over HRK 4.2 billion of funds into the system for the 
settlement of arrears in health care providers, the amount 
of total debts of health care-providing institutions grew by 
staggering 81.5%, while the amount of due arrears grew 
by even higher 137% (Table 2). The majority of obligations 
(62% in 2005) accounted for drugs and consumables (4), 
threatening their undisrupted delivery to the population.
Primary care
Monitoring and regulation of GPs’ referrals and pharma-
ceutical expenditure lacked sophistication and were diffi-
cult to implement in practice – in major part due to the 
absence of IT solutions that would facilitate control. Fur-
thermore, the privatization of primary health care and pay-
ment by capitation – introduced in 1993 as a simple so-
lution to control primary care costs – failed to financially 
stimulate GPs to be efficient. Primary care physicians were 
paid on the basis of flat fees per patient per year regard-
TaBLe 3. Croatian institute for health insurance’s deficits (sur-
plus) from 2002 to 2008, in million hrK
year revenues expenses Difference
2002 14 181 13 857 +324
2003 14 590 14 718 -128
2004 14 687 15 857 -1170
2005 15 565 16 157 -592
2006 16 897 17 389 -492
2007 19 143 18 411 +733
2008 20 6 4 4 20 736 -9269 Vončina et al: Croatian 2008-2010 health insurance reform
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less of the volume and quality of services provided. The 
system created incentives for GPs to accumulate as many 
patients as possible, prohibiting them from providing ef-
ficient quality care (17). Primary care capitation, “matched” 
with fee-for-service payments for hospital specialist exami-
nations and inpatient care, meant that both primary care 
physicians and upper-end providers had financial incen-
tives to see patients referred up the delivery system, in-
stead of managing more patients at the primary care level. 
As a result, the proportion of inpatient spending and hos-
pital admissions had to increase (18).
Nevertheless, a study analyzing the preliminary effects of 
the privatization process for primary health care in Croa-
tia did find some positive effects. Privatized practices per-
formed  better  in  improving  access  to  their  services  for 
patients: they increasingly offered the possibility for first 
and follow-up appointments at precise times, scheduled 
visits by telephone, and provided telephone advice out-
side working hours. They also showed greater intention to 
honor appointment times in order to lower their patients’ 
waiting times (19).
In terms of cost containment efforts and their role as gate-
keepers, primary care physicians play an influential role in 
determining the overall costs of health care (20). In line 
with what was discussed above, reports from the Croatian 
National Institute of Public Health indicate substantial re-
ductions in numbers of rendered preventive services and 
home visits as well as large increases in numbers of (nec-
essary or unnecessary) referrals to secondary and tertiary 
health care.
In 2008, the recorded number of home visits was 290 075, 
a decrease of 47% compared to 1990. Additionally, there 
were 7.491 million referrals from primary care physicians, 
meaning that the number of referrals for secondary and 
tertiary care grew by 49% from 1995. Data for primary care 
service for 2008 show that for every 2.1 regular checkups 
for adults there was one specialist referral. These indicators 
show that primary health care turned into a passive health 
care service that failed to deliver significant impact on the 
positive health outcomes for the population and that the 
capitation fee system was not efficient (21).
Secondary and tertiary care
Hospital services in Croatia were funded through monthly 
allocations of the annual hospital hard budget, controlled 
by the HZZO as the paid funds had to be accounted for by 
TaBLe 4. The 2008 financial reform measures
Measure Specific actions
Diversification of public 
revenue collection 
mechanisms through 
introduction of new 
mandatory health 
insurance (MHI) and 
complementary health 
insurance (CHI) 
contributions
MHI contributions for the retired with pension under average salary paid from general taxation: rate 1% of gross 
pension
Retired with pension over average salary pay MHI contributions: rate 3% of gross pension
MHI contributions for the unemployed paid from general taxation: rate 5% of fixed sum
MHI contributions for pupils, students, war veterans, soldiers, asylum seekers, etc. paid in bulk from the state 
budget
Hypothecated cigarette taxation: 32% of excise duty
Tax on mandatory car insurance premiums: 7% (to cover the cost of health care provided due to traffic 
accidents)
CHI contributions for 100% disabled, organ donors, multiple blood donors, pupils, students, and all individuals 
with income per household member under the national poverty census threshold – paid from general taxation
Increased copayments Inpatient and outpatient hospital services: 20% of price (previously 15%-50%)
Dentistry: 20% of price (previously 15-50%)
Primary care family medicine and gynecology: HRK 15 per visit deductible
Prescriptions – HRK 15 per prescription deductible
Price cap for all copayments: HRK 3000 per episode of illness
Reducing population 
exempted from 
copayments
360 000 citizens became eligible for copayments (unemployed, war veterans, disabled with disability under 
100%, etc.)
Exempted populations: children, pregnant women, patients with HIV, chronic psychiatry patients, transplant 
patients, dialysis and cancer patients, citizens living under the poverty level
Complementary 
health insurance
Price increase from HRK 50 to 80 per month for the best of retired and HRK 80 to 130 for employed with large 
salaries
Financial discipline Stringent control of expenditure on all levels of the system
Resolution of 
accumulated arrears
Rationalization of expenditure
Monitoring of debts and arrears
Ban on increasing arrearshealth Care essay 70 Croat Med J. 2012;53:66-76
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bills for medical services in a combination of a point-based 
hospital payment system and a diagnostic-related groups 
(DRG) system referred to as the payment per therapeutical-
ly procedure (PPTP). If a hospital exceeded its annual bud-
get ceiling, it did not receive funds for the bills for services 
provided once the ceiling was reached. Additionally, hos-
pitals were allowed to charge full payments to those with-
out insurance, and co-payments for the MHI-insured which 
were neither exempt nor had complementary insurance.
The point-based hospital payment system was essential-
ly a fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement system in which 
hospitals were reimbursed on the basis of inputs rather 
than outputs or outcomes. The hospital payment system 
consisted of three separate components: 1) hotel services, 
paid by a flat per diem payment, 2) services, and 3) phar-
maceuticals and other materials that were paid separately, 
depending on the cost of each item. Under the FFS system, 
hospitals had an incentive to maintain a high level of bed 
occupancy and extend length of stay, since this high oc-
cupancy resulted in stable funding through per diem pay-
ments, while the majority of costs tend to be concentrat-
ed in the first few days of hospital stays. Low occupancy 
rates also increased the risk that the HZZO would lower the 
global budget ceiling (22).
In  2002,  the  government  started  introducing  a  parallel 
DRG-based payment system (Croatian: plaćanje po terapi-
jskom postupku, PPTP) that used broad case groupings. In-
terventions for these cases were either costly or numerous 
and the prospective payment system was intended to pro-
vide hospitals with incentives to increase the technical ef-
ficiency of service provision (23). In effect, the HZZO used 
hospital budgets as an expenditure and volume of services 
control mechanism. However, the negotiation of hospital 
budgets ceilings appeared to be a sometimes controver-
sial and insufficiently transparent issue as some hospitals 
struggled to charge enough services to reach their limit, 
while others struggled to stay under the limit. For example, 
in 2005 a part of Croatian hospitals exceeded their bud-
gets by HRK 111 million, while the other part charged HRK 
121 million less than their budgets allowed them to (24). 
It appears that while, in general, smaller county hospitals 
had problems in supplying enough services to reach their 
budget limits, bigger hospitals located in larger cities had 
problems in staying within budgets. This may have been 
due to the government’s dedication on maintaining the 
status quo, or in other words, keeping the smaller hos-
pitals in business rather than reducing them in size, 
or even closing some down. While this policy may 
have been fully legitimate on a national level, a more trans-
parent way of subsidizing some of the smaller hospitals 
may have been worth looking into. The issue was further 
blurred by the fact that it was hard to determine wheth-
er hospitals were overcharging or undercharging for care 
as under the FFS schedule they were able to charge sub-
stantially different amounts for treating similar patients. In 
effect,  the  payment  model  was  awarding  inefficiencies. 
Comparisons of performance indicators with other central 
European countries clearly demonstrate this policy failure 
(25; Supplementary Table 5).
The use of broad-based case groupings in the PPTP sys-
tem, as opposed to more detailed DRGs, and the prices 
set for particular PPTP groupings have made the system 
quite  unpopular  with  providers.  Charging  services  ac-
cording to the FFS system seemed to be far more lucra-
tive than according to the PPTP system, which has often 
been accused of underestimating actual costs. Although, 
legally, these should have not be interchangeable, reports 
on billing practices indicate that hospitals may have been 
engaged in a large scale creative accounting practice (ie, 
cheating) as they charged only 30% of services accord-
ing to the sometimes less lucrative PPTP schedule, while 
epidemiologic  arguments  suggested  that  PPTS  sched-
ule should have covered over 60% of treated conditions 
and  diseases  (26).  Finally,  PPTP  provided  incentives  for 
cream-skimming. Hospitals were able to attempt to avoid 
high-risk, high-cost patients by “dumping” them on other 
providers. An analysis of the Croatian Institute of Public 
Health showed that patients rarely use hospitals in their 
counties (25). It should also be noted that general hos-
pitals (county hospitals) were allowed to refer cases that 
were judged to be clinically complicated to clinics/clinical 
hospital centers that provided state-of-the-art treatment, 
and received equal payment as they would for less com-
plicated cases.
Pharmaceutical market
Similarly to most European countries, over the recent de-
cades Croatia has witnessed fast increase in the demand 
for  medicines.  Such  situation  warranted  the  use  of  for-
eign experiences, which were often of limited usefulness 
as governments have often implemented different mea-
sures in rapid succession or even simultaneously (27,28). 
Key discussions in Croatia mostly related to limiting the 
range  of  pharmaceuticals  eligible  for  payment  or  reim-
bursement under the mandatory and complementary in-
surance schemes; and to proposals that the insured should 71 Vončina et al: Croatian 2008-2010 health insurance reform
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be called to carry a larger part of the financial burden of 
pharmaceutical expenditure.
In 2004, the Croatian government introduced a new sys-
tem of setting maximum prices for drugs, which resulted 
in price cuts of up to 15% on many imported pharmaceu-
ticals. The system took into account drug prices in Italy, 
France, and Slovenia (for example branded drugs had to 
be 10% cheaper than the price average of the 3 mentioned 
countries). The choice of the latter country was significant, 
as Slovenia at that time had a mechanism of setting local 
wholesale prices at 85% of the price of new pharmaceuti-
cals in France, Germany, and Italy. Prices could have been, 
however, also determined by direct negotiation with sup-
pliers. In 2006, the government introduced internal refer-
ence pricing. The government set limits to the reimburse-
ment level for all drugs by using the existence of lower 
priced generic drugs on the market. The reference price 
for all generically equivalent drugs was fixed at an amount 
that the authorities regarded as acceptable. If the price of 
any product was higher than the reference price, MHI pay-
ment or reimbursement would only be granted up to the 
level of the latter, and the difference between this and the 
actual market price would have to be paid by the patient 
(“co-payment principle”). However, until 2007 HZZO’s CHI 
scheme covered the cost of this co-payment, limiting the 
incentives that internal reference pricing brought to phar-
maceutical companies toward decreasing prices to remain 
free at the point of use. This policy on the other hand con-
tributed to CHI’s poor financial results, for instance it ended 
2006 with a deficit of HRK 32.76 million (14). As of 2007, CHI 
no longer covered the medicines’ co-payment and ended 
the financial year with a surplus of HRK 665 million (15).
Until 2008, expenditure on prescription medicines grew at 
a fast pace, amounting to HRK 3.098 billion in 2004, 3.116 
billion in 2005, 3.248 billion in 2006, 3.144 billion in 2007, 
and 3.391 billion in 2008 (9,12-15). Expenditure on prescrip-
tion drugs decreased in 2007 compared to 2006, which im-
plies that the reform had a positive impact on overall costs. 
However, the decrease was obviously temporary since the 
expenditures rose once again in 2008. This leads to a con-
clusion that the 2004 and 2006 health care reforms failed in 
preserving long term budget balance by containing over-
all costs.
Balance of payments
Even the simplest analysis of the balance of payments in 
the 2002-2008 period indicates that in nearly all years HZZO 
was producing deficits (9-15), suggesting that reforms and 
measures implemented in the period failed to prove effec-
tive in the long term (Table 3). An analysis of the dynamics 
of deficits and arrears in the Croatian health care system up 
to 2008 points to several issues. The first and most obvious 
one is that almost every year more funds were spent than 
the state hypothecated for health care, which points to a 
mismatch between the desired level and mix of objectives 
and the limited capacity to pay. The second issue is that 
annually both the HZZO and the providers overspent their 
budgets, which indicates that their budgets could better 
be described as soft budgets, rather than hard budgets – 
which they were intended to be, a conclusion that implies 
low fiscal discipline in the system. To preserve financial li-
quidity, both delayed payments to suppliers and so creat-
ed arrears. Allowing this practice has created a vicious cir-
cle in which arrears skyrocketed and delays grew. In 2008, 
total accumulated arrears reached HRK 4.8 billion. Dynam-
ics of generating new debts was HRK 200 million a month. 
In 2008, the HZZO reimbursed pharmaceutical wholesalers 
with over 290 days of delay (29). The financial issues were 
additionally aggravated by the sick leave rate with its ex-
penditure in 2007, amounting to HRK 1.35 billion (15).
The 2008 refOrM
The 2008 reform focused on financial stabilization and in-
creasing  system  efficiency.  Measures  included  changes 
introduced to the revenue collection mechanism, copay-
ment  levels,  hospital  and  primary  care  payment  mod-
els, introduction of a comprehensive primary health care 
IT system, improved control of sick leave compensations 
and advanced regulation of the pharmaceutical market. 
The necessity of the measures was primarily argued as the 
government at that point had to secure funds additional 
to those already hypothecated for health care in 2008 to 
ensure undisrupted delivery of health care services. These 
amounted to HRK 459 million for hospital arrears settle-
ment, HRK 800 million for prescription drugs arrears settle-
ment, and HRK 100 million for expensive drugs debt settle-
ment (29).
financial stabilization
Main features of the financial component of the reform 
focused  on  diversification  of  public  revenue  collection 
mechanisms, aligning the public private split in funding 
to those of central European countries through increas-
ing copayment levels and reducing the extent of cat-
egories  exempted  from  copayments,  introducing health Care essay 72 Croat Med J. 2012;53:66-76
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stringent financial discipline, and resolution of accumulat-
ed arrears (HZZO and hospitals; Table 4).
The financial effect of the reform on public resources can 
be seen from the expenditure allocations recorded in the 
national state budget. Compared to 2009, in 2011 the Min-
istry of Health and Social Welfare reduced its expenditure 
by HRK 304 million (7.3%), and the HZZO (including HZ-
ZOZZR) by HRK 2.15 billion (9%) cumulating total savings 
of HRK 2.46 billion (29; Supplementary Table 6). An addi-
tional financial effect of the reform measures is revealed 
through the reduction of HZZO and hospital arrears (29; 
Supplementary Table 7) – a reduction of 60%, from HRK 
4.8 to 1.9 billion. Thus, despite the reductions in state bud-
get allocations, the system was able to further constrain 
expenditure so as to liquidate the majority of its arrears. 
The financial savings of the reform from the perspective of 
public finances are primarily due to a) tackling system inef-
ficiencies (rationalization of expenditure) and b) increasing 
the private proportion of funding. While the former will be 
elaborated in more detail later in the text, between 2008 
and 2010 the total amount of copayments paid in primary 
and secondary care increased 2-fold, from HRK 651 million 
to 1.4 billion (29).
The issue of social protection has been addressed through 
a copayment ceiling for episode of illness (HRK 3000), af-
fordable community-rated CHI premiums (ranging from 
HRK 600 to 1560 per year depending on income), and ex-
clusion of certain vulnerable categories of the population 
from copayments. As could have been expected, the rise 
of copayments and the widening of the population cat-
egories  eligible  for  copayments  made  CHI  substantially 
more popular and its number of insured rose from HRK 
710 359 in 2008 to 2.7 million in 2010 (9,30). Of these, 1.4 
million paid premiums out of pocket, the remaining other 
1.3 million were insured by premiums paid from the state 
budget (30).
Apart from the greater reliance on private spending, diver-
sification of revenue sources has been achieved through 
more explicit determination of the state’s obligations on be-
half of the non-contributing insured: MHI contributions for 
the retired and the unemployed, CHI contributions for the 
mentioned categories, cigarette taxation, and car insurance 
tax. While these obligations were in the past paid arbitrarily, 
usually through additional funds for debt settlement, their 
more explicit determination guaranteed that the health 
sector would be able rely on them in the years to come, 
regardless of short-term government priorities and fi-
nancial situation, and that these would relieve the pressure 
of the labor market and the health care system’s dominant 
revenue source – payroll contributions. Bulk sum transfers 
from the state budget on behalf of MHI contributions for 
pupils, students, war veterans, soldiers, asylum seekers, etc, 
amounted to HRK 208 million in 2009. These have not been 
settled in 2010 due to the economic recession and as the 
total sum of public revenues other than MHI contributions 
grew from HRK 2 to 2.4 billion compared to 2009 (Supple-
mentary Table 8), which further testifies of the importance 
of the above mentioned. The implemented measures en-
abled the government to financially consolidate the system 
without limiting the benefits package, ie, the scope and 
quality of health care services provided.
Primary health care iT system: e-primary health care
As of January 2011, e-prescriptions and e-referrals to bio-
chemical  laboratories  in  family  medicine  became  fully 
functional in all Croatian counties. IT in health care has the 
potential of bringing about substantial savings related to 
efficiency and improvements in quality (31). Croatian e-
primary health care project enables secure, real-time ex-
change of data between all primary health care stakehold-
ers and hospitals. The system was primarily designed to 
improve and simplify the delivery of health care to patients 
– patients no longer have to collect their laboratory find-
ings as these are delivered directly to doctors, doctors are 
informed of dispensing of prescribed medicines so that 
they can monitor compliance, etc. Main benefits for health 
professionals include substantial relief from administrative 
tasks, which are now fully automated, and improved com-
munication with other stakeholders in the system. Health 
care authorities benefit from significant savings from print-
ing prescriptions and referrals, productivity and efficiency 
gains, automated checking of all insurance data, and real-
time information that enables informed decision-making 
with the aim of increasing the efficiency and equity of 
health care provision, such as for example prescribing or 
referral patterns, etc.
Primary health care reform
The health care reform introduced several structural and 
financial changes to primary health care. The system was 
decentralized through the introduction of concessions – 
tenders  that  county  governments  organize  for  primary 
care specialties in the frame of the national network for 
teams operating outside of primary health care centers in 
which doctors work as salaried professionals. These have 73 Vončina et al: Croatian 2008-2010 health insurance reform
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empowered counties (local authorities) to play a more ac-
tive role in the organization, coordination, and manage-
ment of their respective primary health care systems with 
the aim of better tailoring these to local needs. Geograph-
ic equity of access has been ensured by standardizing the 
number of capitated patients per team. Furthermore, the 
maximum and minimum number of patients allowed per 
team was determined at the level ±25% from the standard 
number with a three-year transitional period for compli-
ance (32; Supplementary Tables 9 and 10).
Alongside the implementation of concessions, the reform 
entailed a change in the primary health care provider pay-
ment mechanism, introducing a fee for service payments 
and payments for special programs (preventive medicine 
and 24/7 open family medicine centers). GPs now earn 
80% of income through capitation, while the remaining 
20% of income depends on their activities. While data on 
activities (preventive checkups, referrals, etc.) are as of yet 
not available, the new financial incentives should ensure 
improved primary care productivity and efficiency in the 
years to come. Finally, a new incentive payment system 
was introduced for primary health care centers to fill va-
cancies on islands, and in rural and less developed areas to 
improve geographical equity of access.
HZZO’s total expenditure on sick leave compensations in 
2010 amounted to HRK 1.1 billion, compared to HRK 1.22 
billion in 2009, which led to savings of over 108 million HRK. 
The savings are due to stricter controls of primary care phy-
sicians prescribing sick leaves introduced in 2009. In 2010, 
the total number of sick leave days amounted to 14.765 
million working days, 1944 million fewer than in 2009, con-
siderably reducing costs, but also contributing to the over-
all productivity of the Croatian economy (30).
hospital payment – diagnosis related groups
Encouraged by reports of efficiency gains arising from the 
implementation of the PPTP schedule, including reductions 
in  length  of  stay,  the  government  decided  to  gradually 
move toward a comprehensive prospective case-adjusted 
payment system based on DRGs. As in some other Europe-
an countries, such as Ireland, Romania, Germany, and Slove-
nia, Croatia has decided not to develop its own DRG system, 
but rather to import and modify the Australian Refined-DRG 
(AR-DRG) system (specifically, version 5.1), in Croatia known 
under the abbreviation DTS (Croatian: Dijagnostičko terapi-
jske skupine) (23). The DTS payment system was fully imple-
mented on January 1, 2009. Payment results of the DTS pay-
ment system (length of stay, costs, etc, by DRG) have since 
then been published monthly for all hospitals on HZZO’s 
Web site, enabling benchmarking.
The main intention of the DTS payment system was to en-
able cost reduction and rationalization, as well as affect 
concrete performance indicators such as shorter hospi-
talization time (average length of stay per hospitalization), 
and  thus  higher  patient  turnover,  which  would  reduce 
waiting lists for certain procedures. Despite the slight in-
crease in length of stay from 2009 to 2010, which can ten-
tatively be explained by its sharp drop in the first year of 
implementation, the DTS system has proved successful in 
decreasing length of stay in both university and general 
hospitals (Supplementary Table 11).
Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement reform
In 2009, Croatia substantially reformed its pricing and reim-
bursement regulation for medicines with the aim of maxi-
mizing value for invested funds, increasing the efficiency 
and transparency of high level decision-making, and en-
suring  ethical  pharmaceutical  marketing  practice  (33). 
Most notably, the reform measures include defined judg-
ment criteria and full public disclosure of the reimburse-
ment decision-making process, pricing reforms, strength-
ening of evidence-based medicine and health economic 
requirements for submissions, pay back, rebate, and cross 
product agreements, mandatory reporting of promotional 
expenses, and all financial transactions between pharma-
ceutical companies and doctors employed by the public 
health care system, etc. The results of the reform enabled 
HZZO to generate extensive savings while at the same 
time improving access to innovative medicines (32).
Total  HZZO’s  expenditure  on  prescription  medicines  in 
2009 amounted to HRK 2.9 billion, with additional 2 billion 
spent on hospital medicines (of which 480 million were 
spent on expensive products that are funded from a sepa-
rate budget above regular hospital budgets). Due to the 
introduction of modest copayments (HRK 15 per prescrip-
tion) and reference pricing, HZZO’s expenditure on pre-
scription medicines decreased by 2.9% in comparison to 
2008 (34). HZZO’s due arrears for medicines also substan-
tially decreased in the time period, from HRK 1.3 billion to 1 
billion, with a reduction of 22% (35).
Additionally, all applications to the HZZO’s lists became 
public. All applications are published on HZZO’s web 
page within five work days following the day of their health Care essay 74 Croat Med J. 2012;53:66-76
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receipt. Membership of the HZZO’s Committee for Medici-
nal Products and the timing and agendas of the regular ses-
sions also become public. The methodology in which the 
committee reaches its recommendations was advanced 
and made more transparent. The committee now operates 
in two semi-annual cycles. The cycles consist of four regu-
lar sessions where the Committee discusses the submit-
ted applications and of the fifth regular session where it 
ranks the applications that may increase HZZO’s expendi-
ture on drugs. Ranking is undertaken using Delphi – a con-
sensus building method making sure that all members of 
the committee carry equal weight in the decision making 
process. In addition, the new ordinances introduced de-
tailed criteria based on which the committee is to reach its 
recommendations. These include the following: 1) impor-
tance of a medicinal product from the public health view-
point; 2) therapeutic importance of a medicinal product; 3) 
relative therapeutic value of a medicinal product; 4) assess-
ment of ethical aspects and 5) quality and reliability of data 
and assessments from reference sources.
The requirements for the applications based on which the 
committee makes its recommendations have also been 
raised.  Most  importantly,  these  (among  others)  include 
(36) 1) a tabular presentation of the status of the product 
in health insurance or health care system of all Member 
States of the European Union and, if available, a decision 
or opinion about financing of the product issued by the 
competent authority engaged in the assessment of health 
care technology, along with indications and instructions 
for use, amount covered by the compulsory health insur-
ance of each State, amount of surcharges and other infor-
mation relevant for financing of the medicinal product in 
individual Member States; 2) scientific evidence demon-
strating the advantages of the medicinal product for sug-
gested indication(s) over the comparators, and primarily 
over medicinal products already included in the basic or 
in the supplementary reimbursement list of the Institute 
(meta analyses and systematic appraisals where available); 
and 3) therapeutic guidelines of Croatian and European 
expert associations for indications for which an application 
has been submitted. All applications for reimbursement of 
original products have to be accompanied by budget im-
pact analyses. These are undertaken according to strict cri-
teria that largely adhere to International Society for Phar-
macoeconomics and Outcomes Research’s “Principles of 
Good practice for Budget Impact Analysis.
Internal  reference  pricing  became  better  regulated. 
Groups are formed at the third or higher anatomi-
cal therapeutic chemical level. Reference prices are deter-
mined (in major part by taking account of price by defined 
daily dose) by unit dosage form for same or similar phar-
maceutical forms, for each strength of the active substance 
and each pack size separately. Reference prices are deter-
mined on the basis of the lowest price of a product which 
recorded at least 5% of sales within a therapeutic group 
over a 12-month period preceding the reference pricing 
process. This principle was adopted to avoid the possibility 
of market shortages.
All applicants to the lists are also obliged to enter into a 
uniform  Agreement  on  Ethical  Promotion  of  Medicines 
with substantial financial penalties for unethical promo-
tion. Main features of the agreement include 1) mandatory 
reporting of all promotional expenses and financial trans-
actions between companies and doctors employed by the 
public health care system; 2) ban on advertising and distri-
bution of prescription drugs to the general population; 3) 
ban on informing the general population on ongoing ap-
plications to avoid unethical pressure on the HZZO’s medi-
cines committee; 4) ban on promotion targeted at doctors 
based on information that has not been scientifically prov-
en; 5) ban on financial remuneration and remuneration of 
any kind to doctors for prescribing; 6) representation costs 
have been limited to HRK 1000 per doctor (does not in-
clude education); 7) individual sales representatives are al-
lowed 15 minutes contact time per doctor per month.
CONCLuSiON
In conclusion, while the previous reforms of the Croatian 
health care system paid little attention to root causes be-
hind the system’s financial unsustainability issue, the 2008 
reform tried to address these through a set of coordinated 
measures targeted at both the demand and supply side 
of the system. Its importance is highlighted by the eco-
nomic recession Croatia has undergone in the recent past 
that has made it hard to pursue alternative directions as it 
has seriously affected the government’s ability to gener-
ate additional funds for the system. The implementation 
of the reform required tough choices such as substantial-
ly increasing private funding to the level of other Central 
European countries, but also coherent and sophisticated 
measures targeted at resolving system inefficiencies such 
as improving pricing and reimbursement regulation for 
medicines, changes to the primary care capitation mod-
el, the introduction of DRGs in hospitals and information 
technology  in  primary  health  care,  etc.  All  represented 
changes to the inherited status quo and as such generat-75 Vončina et al: Croatian 2008-2010 health insurance reform
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ed stiff opposition from system stakeholders. Nevertheless, 
governments as long-term stewards have the responsibil-
ity of taking tough decisions. The Croatian 2008 reform did 
this, and future health reforms should build on its achieve-
ments to further improve the regulation of the system. 
Finally, its success has been recognized by international 
institutions such as the World Bank having in mind the im-
provements it introduced in fiscal sustainability, reductions 
in outstanding arrears, as well as investments in improved 
patient access (37).
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